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Abstract 
 
Debates about bringing a parliamentary dimension to international organisations in this era of 
rapid globlisation and the subsequent regulatory fragmentation are nothing new. These are as 
part of the effort to reduce the democratic deficit and thus increase the democratic accountability 
and legitimacy of international institutions, in particular the United Nations (UN). This paper 
discusses the factors that most likely influence the absence of a global parliament, namely a UN 
Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA), while many well-known regional organisations have their 
parliamentary wing, as in the case of the Andean Parliament, the MERCOSUR Parliament or 
Pan-African Parliament of the African Union, the parliamentary assemblies of NATO, of the 
Council of Europe, and of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) or 
the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly. On a theoretical level, the paper distinguishes 
different political concepts of democracy, that is, power (authority), accountability and 
legitimacy, in order to identify which aspects are the most relevant to the ongoing discourse 
about a global democratic deficit in international institutions and to investigate, through the 
constructivist lens, into how the convergence (or divergence) of potential epistemic communities 
around normative concerns as well as causal beliefs about the democratic deficit of international 
organisations have contributed to an increase (or decrease) in transnational parliamentarisation. 
In an empirical part, the debate on the UN reform, with particular emphasis on the Security 
Council reform, and the role of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in the process were 
presented as two examples of affecting the pace of the democratisation of global governance, 
which are theoretically associated mostly with realism and partially with neoliberal 
institutionalism.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The world is now witnessing immense challenges, such as the global financial crisis, global 
warming and climate change, international terrorism, and spread of epidemic diseases, which 
cannot be solved by individual nations acting alone. It is becoming all the more evident in our 
era of globalization that the most fundamental problems affecting the lives of individuals can 
only be addressed by global action on a global basis, and that the mechanisms of the past for 
doing so, such as informal intergovernmental cooperation in the G-20 and such treaty 
conventions as the stalled Climate Change conferences of Copenhagen, South Africa, Warsaw 
and Paris are ineffective, slow, and so insulated from the people as to suffer serious democratic 
deficits. 
 
Keohane argues that true democracy heeds the voice of the people. It is achieved through the 
mechanism of periodic elections that hold elected leaders accountable to publics and other 
mechanisms that hold non-elected leaders accountable to elected ones. It also requires an 
institutional constitution of a democratically elected parliament whose main responsibility is to 
create political legitimacy through public representation; the existence of an active civil society 
whose discussions are heard throughout the polity; substantial governmental transparency and 
procedures to ensure that leaders defend their policies in public, signifying democratic 
accountability that those who exercise power have to report to the citizens that are affected by 
their actions. However, ‘without the legal and institutional infrastructure that makes democracy 
work, nominal adherence to democratic principles at a global level will be illusory’, especially 
when it comes to international organisations
1
.  
 
Against this background, as public policies are increasingly shifting to the international level, 
and ever more decisions are being made in international organisations, this internationalization 
                                                 
1
 Keohane, R. O. (2015). Nominal democracy? Prospects for democratic global governance. International Journal 
of Constitutional Law, 13(2): 344. 
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of policy-making creates “participatory gap” that undermines the “input legitimacy of policy-
making” (Brühl and Rittberger, 2001: 22-23)2  because the broader public is excluded from 
deliberations and decision-making taken by international organisations. 
 
This “democratic deficit” is no exception to the United Nations (UN), one of the key 
intergovernmental organisations in global governance. Although “We the people of the United 
Nations” is the well-known opening phrase of the UN Charter, it is clear that peoples around the 
globe have minimal participation in the UN’s two major political organs, the General Assembly 
and the Security Council, which means that democratic deficit seems to be prevalent throughout 
the entire UN system. Furthermore, both the General Assembly and the Security Council 
constitute diplomats appointed by the executive branch of Member States. None of these 
appointees are chosen, let alone elected, by citizens of Member States; none of them are even 
selected by parliaments,
3
 which runs counter to the principles of one of the primary types of 
democracy – representative/electoral democracy -- where the power of the people is delegated to 
representatives periodically elected by them, who then assemble to make decisions on their 
behalf. One can derive from this fact that being directly chosen or elected is criteria that can 
increase legitimacy, or decrease the democratic deficit.  
 
As such, many international organisations, particularly the UN, are frequently criticized for the 
absence of meaningful global citizen participation (i.e. citizen election of their representatives), 
so that it would add to the legitimacy of actions taken by such institutions
4
. A variety of 
proposals have been made to close the gap between their increasing power and the lack of 
effective controlling (oversight) arrangements to prevent abuses of power.  
 
One way to bridge this gap is to establish an international parliamentary assembly as a 
consultative body attached to an international organisation. It is usually composed of 
parliamentarians appointed by the parliaments of the organisation’s Member States. Examples of 
                                                 
2
 Mendlovitz, S. H., & Walker, B. (2003). A Reader on Second Assembly & Parliamentary Proposals. New York: 
Centre for UN Reform Education: 2. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Mendlovitz, S. H., & Walker, B. (2003). A Reader on Second Assembly & Parliamentary Proposals. New York: 
Centre for UN Reform Education: 2. 
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existing such parliamentary assemblies include: The Pan African Parliament, the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Francophonie.  
 
A parliamentary assembly may also be constituted by direct international elections, as in the case 
of the European Parliament of the European Union, to date the most highly evolved example and 
model of a parliamentary assembly. Existing models may develop into the future to assume the 
greater powers of a true constitutional parliament. Transitional parliamentarisation of the 
international organisations like the UN in the form of either a parliamentary assembly as part of 
the institutional design of the UN or a directly-elected worldwide parliament (since the former 
can be an intermediate step on the roads towards a permanent global legislature representing the 
world citizens and working with a global government, if ever established in the distant future, 
both terminologies are used interchangeably throughout the following sections in this paper), is 
the best way to add the citizen dimension to the UN, while ensuring that any expansion in the 
UN’s authority will be supplemented by the enhancement of democratic accountability. 
 
Unfortunately, thus far no such parliamentary assembly exists on the global level. Hence, 
attempting to understand why this is the case, this paper investigates “what are the important 
reasons why a UN Parliamentary Assembly was never realized and still does not exist?” To 
answer this question, this paper is structured as follows: The first chapter examines what has 
been discussed and what is left under-researched in academic circles in terms of the global 
democratic deficit of international organisations. The second chapter will assess the theoretical 
approaches using three rival theories in International Relations, namely realism, neoliberal 
institutionalism and constructivism, from which one hypothesis is derived and the other two are 
used as a basis of counterarguments against the given hypothesis. The third and fourth chapters 
will reflect on the research design and findings, including conceptualization of “democratic 
deficit” and methods of data collection to test my predictions. 
 
1.2 Literature Review   
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The locus of the polity -- active citizenship and representative democracy -- flourishes at the 
level of the nation state. However, the issue at hand is that there is no such thing as global 
government or global citizenship. While there are solid institutions of global civil society in the 
form of NGOs, they tend to have less leverage at the global level than at the national level due to 
the absence of global citizenship. The norms and rules of transparency and due process that 
allow citizens to influence policy-making at the national level are far less developed 
internationally
5
. 
 
Thus, international democracy has become a key aspect of the contemporary academic and 
political debate. Palea makes an important point that the widely felt need for democracy at the 
international level is a consequence of three phenomena: the regional integration and 
globalization processes, the erosion of state sovereignty and the democratic deficit of the 
international organisations. Even though a comprehensive survey of this area regarding 
democratic deficit in global governance would be timely for all too many reasons, it was not 
readily available until now
6
. 
 
From the pre-Cold War period until after the end of the Cold War, many scholars, most of whom 
are based on realism, have strongly argued that the idea of global democracy is nothing but a 
remote possibility with little prospect of realization in the real world. For example, Bull observes 
that ‘there is not the slightest evidence that sovereign states in this century will agree to 
subordinate themselves to a world government founded upon consent’7. Moreover, Robert Dahl, 
one of the most foremost scholars of democracy, not only underscores the lacking democratic 
quality of international organisations, but poses a more fundamental question: “Can international 
organisations, institutions or processes be democratic?” and “If it is difficult for ordinary citizens 
to influence foreign policy decisions in their own country, should we not conclude that the 
obstacles will be far greater in international organisations?” 8 . Even Keohane, known as a 
                                                 
5
 Robert Kuttner. (7 October 2014). Global Governance of Capital: A Challenge for Democracy. (Demos). 
Retrieved from http://www.demos.org/publication/global-governance-capital-challenge-democracy 
6
 Roberto Palea. (July 2014). Democracy in International Organizations. (The Federalist Debate Book ReviewYear 
XXVII, Number 2). Retrieved from http://www.federalist-debate.org/index.php/current/item/919-democracy-in-
international-organizations 
7
 Bull, H. (1977). The Anarchical society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Palgrave Macmillan: 252. 
8
 Dahl, R. A. (1999). Can international organizations be democratic? A sceptic’s view. Democracy’s edges: 19-23. 
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prominent critic of the realist view of the world, highlights that ‘the vision of a system of 
democratic accountability or legitimacy in world politics would be utopian in the sense of 
illusory – impossible of realization under realistically foreseeable conditions’9. 
 
Even on rare occasions when discussing how to bridge the democratic deficit of international 
organisations, Habegger
10
 argues that the integration of civil society actors, namely Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), was often proposed in order to bring more accountability 
into international organisations. Contrary to this popular view in favour of the enhancement of 
the role of international NGOs and other civil society actors in challenging dominant global 
discourses, NGOs are not actually a perfect fit for the job of democratising international regimes 
because they are not representatives of the people in general and not subject to scrutiny by the 
electorate either. Rather, they seek special interests and have often highly sensitive political 
agendas. Moreover, the North-South divide is obvious with the North camp gaining the upper 
hand over the South when it comes to the formal and direct participation in international 
policymaking.  
 
In addition, NGOs have much weaker institutional capacity compared to governments, to which 
intergovernmental organisations are accountable. Like NGOs, international organisations 
themselves are also a weaker body vis-a-vis the states because the latter authorize their creation 
and provide financial support for continuity of existence. Whenever international organisations 
lose the ground to states due to their inherently weak positions, NGOs vehemently criticize the 
former as “unaccountable”. Their real targets should be instead powerful states and rich 
governments; however, it is the intergovernmental organisations that are often unnecessarily hit 
hard by NGOs. Thus, “accountability to whom” is equally important as “lack of accountability” 
itself
11
. It means that NGOs should be more careful about being accountable to the right groups.  
 
Compared to this much-discussed idea regarding the role of NGOs, what is often missing is the 
option of creating networks among parliamentarians or establishing parliamentary organs. 
                                                 
9
 Keohane, R. O. (2006). Accountability in World Politics. Scandinavian Political Studies, 29(2): 77. 
10
 Habegger, B. (2010). Democratic accountability of international organizations: Parliamentary control within the 
Council of Europe and the OSCE and the prospects for the United Nations. Cooperation and Conflict, 45(2): 189. 
11 Keohane, R. O. Global Governance and Democratic Accountability: 19-20. 
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‘Parliamentary assemblies of international organisations are rarely mentioned about the 
democratic deficit or lack of democratic accountability at the international level and the potential 
institutional remedies to mitigate it’12. 
 
It is only a relatively recent trend in international politics, as shown by the fact that in 1945 – 
when the UN was established – no international parliamentary assembly existed in the world. 
And yet, 45 parliamentary assemblies have been established after World War II and most of 
them in the post-Cold War period. In this context, I plan to delve into whether bringing a 
parliamentary dimension into the UN in order to fix its democratic deficit problem is feasible at 
all when it already happened at the regional level and if not, what factors are influencing the low 
possibility throughout the following sections. 
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework  
 
It is not always all too clear when sceptics consider global democracy (i.e. realization of 
representative democracy at the international level through the creation of a UN Parliamentary 
Assembly) to be impossible rather than just highly unlikely. Many realist authors would make 
the case for empirical impossibility as one of the prominent realists, Robert Gilpin (1981), states 
that ‘Realism is based on practices of states, and it seeks to understand how states have always 
behaved and presumably will always behave. And international relations continue to be a 
recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy’13. 
However, liberal sceptics may be less inflexible than their realist counterparts. For instance, 
Keohane’s remark quoted earlier could be interpreted as hinting that global democracy may 
come into being according to different conditions that are forecast only in the far distant future. 
Another IR theory, which is constructivism, can even offer brighter prospects for the future of 
global democracy. 
 
                                                 
12
 Habegger, B. (2010). Democratic accountability of international organizations: Parliamentary control within the 
Council of Europe and the OSCE and the prospects for the United Nations. Cooperation and Conflict, 45(2): 189-
190. 
13
 Gilpin, R. (1983). War and change in world politics. Cambridge University Press: 226-227. 
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With an aim to clarify ambiguities about the perceived desirability and feasibility of establishing 
a UN Parliamentary Assembly, I am going to base my predictions on three IR theories briefly 
mentioned as above, from each of which I will derive hypotheses or assumed cause-effect 
relations for my study about global democratic deficit and the possibility of creating a 
parliamentary organ of the UN.  
 
2.1 Independent Variables 
2.1.1 Constructivism: Convergence on the Definitions of the Global Democratic Deficit 
 
Firstly on a brighter note, which is from the constructivists’ point of view, ‘an institution is 
deemed legitimate if its exercise of power is justified by moral and socially embedded beliefs. If 
an international organisation fails to reflect these shared beliefs in its practices and objectives, 
either because of normative change or because it applies rules in contexts where supporting 
beliefs are in shortage, it entails a legitimacy deficit, which in the worst case can turn into a 
legitimacy crisis, when the decline in legitimacy, or its failure to cultivate sufficient legitimacy, 
has reached a critical turning point’14.   
 
Overwhelmed by an increasing need for international cooperation to tackle global challenges, 
many stress that some international institutions may embody a bolder vision and require greater 
political transformations. In these circumstances, while it is accepted that long-standing interests 
and identities remain unchanged, new ones are produced by these institutions which in due 
course allow for deeper integration. In case where this is so, such integration means that the issue 
of democratic representation must be addressed. ‘State-level representatives will be incapable of 
effectively holding such institutions accountable. The solution, then, could be the establishment 
of international assemblies of representatives specifically (s)elected for this purpose and other 
forms of direct accountability to citizens. Those who argue for this type of “international liberal 
democracy” often depict themselves as “cosmopolitans”’.15 
 
                                                 
14
 Zaum, D. (Ed.). (2013). Legitimating international organizations. Oxford University Press: 8. 
15
 Vaughne Miller & Jon Lunn. (2014). The European Union: a democratic institution? - Research Paper 14/25:10. 
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But new norms do not float freely. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, norms go through a 
“life cycle”. ‘In the first stage, norms are built by the interplay of human agency, indeterminacy, 
chance occurrences and favourable events’ 16 . One major source of agency is offered by 
transnational networks of knowledge-based experts or epistemic communities who can act as 
norm entrepreneurs that can successfully convince political actors to embrace new norms, in this 
case, the establishment of a parliamentary assembly in the UN. Under such premise, the question 
that can be addressed is: “Is it sufficient enough to prove that creating a UN Parliamentary 
Assembly (UNPA) is a highly practical, tested and workable idea whose time has come solely 
due to the fact that it is supported by a host of high profile figures concerned, such as the former 
UN Secretary-General and Presidents of the European Parliament and Pan-African Parliament?” 
 
To provide an answer to this question, I will turn to one of the prominent constructivists’ models 
of norm dynamics – the norm life cycle. As the first condition for the emergence of epistemic 
communities regarding a UNPA, a set of normative concerns about the democratic deficit and a 
lack of democratic legitimacy in the UN should be shared by a broad range of professionals and 
expert communities
17
. In reality, even though a near-universal consensus could be found among 
knowledge-based experts about the “undemocratic” character of the UN, one does not observe 
the emergence of an epistemic community which could act as a norm entrepreneur group. 
 
In this respect, what I want to analyse further is whether those experts, professionals, and 
regional and global political leaders also have a similar set of causal beliefs about cause and 
effect relationships, which means members of a potential epistemic community should have not 
just shared normative concerns about the problem itself, but also they should reach a consensus 
on the definitions (nature) of the given problem of a democratic deficit in existing international 
institutions (i.e. the UN), such as what caused it, what it entails and how to deal with it. It is all 
because there are so many different understandings and variations of a single concept, namely 
democracy. Within the constructivist norm research, I would devise the hypothesis to be tested in 
the following manner: 
                                                 
16
 Finnemore, M., and Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, International 
Organization, 54(4): 896. 
17
 Osman Sabri Kiratli. (2013). Democratic Deficit Critiques and the Non-Role of Epistemic Communities in the 
European. Union. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 3(12) [Special Issue – June 2013]: 230. 
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H – Convergence (Divergence) among norm entrepreneurs (potential epistemic communities) 
around the causal beliefs of the democratic deficit problem of international organisations will 
decrease (increase) the global democratic deficit and thus make the creation of an international 
parliamentary assembly more (less) likely. 
 
Against this backdrop, ‘the democratic question then becomes how dispersed, critical, and 
competent influence can be established. The idea of transnational democracy is to be found in 
communicatively competent, decentralized control over the content and relative weight of 
globally consequential discourses, which in turn resonates with theories of deliberative 
democracy stressing communicative action in the public sphere’18. Thus, the democratisation of 
global governance is determined by engagement of potential epistemic communities in due 
deliberation processes to convince others that materialisation of global politics is imminent 
through the set-up of a global parliamentary assembly.  
 
Besides employing the norm dynamics borrowed from constructivism to test the given 
hypothesis, realism and neo-liberal institutionalism will further help to explain the likelihood of 
raising or reducing the global democratic deficit leading to the creation of an international 
parliamentary assembly. From a realist perspective on the international system, great power 
status is a matter of military and economic resources. To break down into further detail, unlike 
classical realists, structural realists or neo-realists, believe in the stark contrast of international 
politics to domestic ones, and that the anarchic feature of the international system begets a series 
of uncertainties, which in turn offers ample reason to fight for survival in the absence of 
international government. ‘They assume that the sovereign-less international environment 
penalises any and all states that fail to protect their vital national interests, or pursue national 
interests beyond their capabilities. Consequently, states are said to be constantly engaging in 
means-ends calculations’19.  
 
                                                 
18
 Wheatley, S. (2010). The democratic legitimacy of international law. Bloomsbury Publishing: 87. 
19
 Meierhenrich, J. (2012). International Organisations. University of London International Programmes by The 
London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London: 25. 
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2.1.2 Realist Approaches: Stronger Power Inequalities among Member States 
 
To begin with, structural realists contend that states are very keen on losing their relative 
capabilities (any relative loss in balance of strength vis-a-vis potential enemies' capabilities), 
which alludes to the so-called relative gains problem in international cooperation. Following 
Waltz, Grieco argues that states make the maintenance of their relative position in the 
international anarchic structure a top priority, instead of blindly pursuing absolute power, wealth 
or security, as classical realists had suggested. In so doing, states are unwilling to support or join 
international organisations if they find other states in a more advantageous position where the 
latter stand to gain more. On the same argument, some states even give up on obvious gains from 
international cooperation if that has a high chance of working in favour of other states
20
.  
 
John Mearsheimer, who developed a famous argument in the 1990s about what he calls “the 
false promise of international institutions”, ‘international organisations will never be more than a 
reflection of the distribution of power in the international system, and they are nothing more than 
arenas for acting out power relationships among contending states, in contrast to neo-liberal 
arguments in defence of international organisations’21. 
 
The ensuing debate has focused both on the structures and on the decision-making processes of 
international organisations. ‘For example, supporters of UN Security Council reform have 
focused very much on the lack of representativeness of the fifteen-member Council dominated 
by the victors of the Second World War, and argue that this has fuelled a legitimacy deficit that 
threatens the credibility and authority of the institution’. They take note of the absence of any 
African and Latin American permanent members, and the need to accommodate the changes in 
international order since the end of the Cold War, in particular the emergence of a number of 
non-Western rising powers such as India and Brazil.
22
. 
 
                                                 
20
 Ibid.  
21
 Ibid. 26.  
22
 Zaum, D. (Ed.). (2013). Legitimating international organizations. Oxford University Press: 4. 
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As such, decision-making is frequently characterized by political bargaining between members, 
and often dominated by a few powerful states. These bargaining processes by which decisions 
are reached are more likely to be secretive and opaque, rather than adhering to closely prescribed 
and codified processes. By the logic of this reasoning, they are not prepared to accept the idea of 
creating a global parliament that would be entrusted with genuine democratic rights of control 
and oversight over what they are doing.  
 
In summary, according to the realist school of thought, a state is forced within the anarchic and 
competitive conditions of international relations to expand its power over the international 
system. If the state fails to make this attempt, it risks the possibility that other states will increase 
their relative power positions and will thereby put its existence or vital interests in danger. 
Therefore, for realism, ‘there is no path leading to a global democratic polity’23.  
 
2.2.3 Neoliberal Institutionalism: Member States’ Competing Norms in International 
Organisations 
 
Theoretically, liberals, contrary to realists’ beliefs, are convinced that international politics goes 
beyond the maximization of power, wealth or security, and that individuals as well as states are 
able to cooperate with each other despite the fact that the international system is anarchic. And 
‘what all liberals have in common is a belief that the distribution of power in the international 
system is far less determinative of international outcomes than realists suggest. Furthermore, 
liberals of all persuasions think that international institutions matter, whether they come in the 
form of international law (think of Grotius) or in the form of international organisations (think of 
Kant)’24.  
 
At the turn of the late twentieth century, the new variant that liberalism spawned, known as 
neoliberal institutionalism, claims that international organisations provide focal points 
connecting between states to cooperate through their structures and processes. Over the last 30 
                                                 
23
 Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2011). Is global democracy possible? European journal of international relations: 532. 
24
 Meierhenrich, J. (2012). International Organisations. University of London International Programmes by The 
London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London: 31. 
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years or so, many democrats have viewed that politicians are increasingly unable to exercise 
power effectively within and through states. Those who take this view contend that economic 
globalization, which has been coupled with the emergence of influential non-state actors such as 
multinational corporations and NGOs, means that politics must transcend national borders. In 
their view, many policy challenges today require growing international cooperation. 
 
A subset of this new variant (neoliberal institutionalism) is referred to as regime theory of 
international institutions invented quite surprisingly by Stephen Krasner who was and remains a 
neo-realist. ‘Krasner famously defines international regimes as “sets of implicit and explicit 
principles, norms and rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge”’. Regime theory is significant in that international arrangements, as a main focus of 
attention, are less institutionalised than international organisations while assuming similar roles 
or performing similar functions. To put it differently, most international organisations are 
embedded in larger contexts of international regimes. ‘Although regime theorists do not deny the 
central significance for international politics of either power or interest, what newly emerged was 
a recognition that all kinds of persistent and connected ways of doing things (principles, norms, 
rules, decision-making procedures) matter as well’25. 
 
However, international organisations are not always necessarily useful frameworks for norm-
based discourses in practice because of their internal conflicts surrounding competing norms, 
namely order versus justice in the UN. Accordingly, it can be even more difficult to converge on 
a new norm of establishing an international parliamentary organ of the UN amid the diminishing 
power of collective understandings of what was once considered to be the fundamental principles 
underpinning the entire organisation.  
 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
One of the urgent tasks needed to perform when debating on the democratic legitimacy of 
international institutions is to identify and sort out the variations in terminology. The core 
concepts of that debate regarding democracy take many different forms. With the objective of 
                                                 
25
 Ibid. 33. 
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clarifying the meaning of these terms, this chapter makes a distinction between different notions 
and relates them with one another. This process will allow me to locate the idea of transnational 
parliamentarisation in the global discourse of democratizing international organisations
26
. 
 
With an ultimate aim to assess the extent to which norm entrepreneurs converge on the concerns 
and causal beliefs about the norm in question, I took note of a number of inter-linked political 
concepts which must be dealt with in order to sharpen our understanding of democracy in 
general and the international democratic deficit to be specific. Amongst the most important 
notions, are power (or authority), accountability and legitimacy chosen for my investigation.  
 
3.1 Power or Authority 
The first concept called power or authority exercised by international organisations refers to the 
delegation of authority from states, the moral authority like their compliance with the values 
upheld by the global society as opposed to those of self-interested states, and finally their expert 
authority. ‘The idea of expertise is central to the ability of international organisations to 
dominate and control. In this respect, Jürgen Habermas observes the ‘tendency to 
bureaucratisation in the administration of the state and increased role for highly specialised 
experts removed from the supervision of ‘rationally debating bodies’27.  
 
Any government in involved in the exercise of political authority or power by some people over 
others. In both theory and practice, power has no intrinsic association with democracy. As has 
been the case in the past and even now, absolute monarchies and tyrannical regimes exercise 
absolute power without limitations. While unchecked power is being wielded in many parts of 
the world, supporters of all types of democracy claim that its great virtue is to control the 
exercise of power through the constitutional structure of separation of powers between different 
branches of government, namely checks and balances. They also assert that these systems 
strengthen the effectiveness of power whenever it is exercised
28
. The link between power and a 
                                                 
26 Krajewski, M. (2010). Legitimizing global economic governance through transnational parliamentarization: The 
parliamentary dimensions of the WTO and the World Bank: 2. 
27 Wheatley, S. (2010). The democratic legitimacy of international law. Bloomsbury Publishing: 77-78. 
28 Vaughne Miller & Jon Lunn. (2014). The European Union: a democratic institution?-Research Paper 14/25:6. 
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need for some limits on it in the democratic system naturally leads us to explain the second 
pertinent notion of democracy, which is accountability. 
 
3.2 Accountability 
 
Accountability is another concept that lies at the heart of (transnational) democracy. Numerous 
authors claim that a significant part of reform should be focused on reducing the accountability 
deficit in global governance.  
 
Barnett and Finnemore observe that
29
: 
 
Accountability matters because the absence of accountability implies that those with 
power ‘have the capacity to act without regard for those who authorize their actions and 
for those whose lives are affected’. It is the idea of accountability that separates the 
exercise of power from domination. 
 
In this context, power inherently comes with accountability, which means the responsibility to be 
held answerable for. As such, it is argued that international organisations should do likewise by 
clarifying reasons for their decisions and a specific course of action.  
 
In a democracy, relationships based on accountability are constituted by citizens and public 
office holders, whether they be elected or appointed. ‘Citizens are entitled to hold those in power 
to account, either as the source of that power (the delegation model), or as the body of persons 
affected by it (the participation model), or both’. Performance deficits and failing to live up to 
people’s expectations may result in any form of compensation, such as words of apology, 
resignations and even a shutdown of the institution. ‘The ability to sanction those in power for 
poor performance provides a powerful incentive for responsible and, more importantly, 
responsive decision-making. Decision-makers ‘have an incentive to respond effectively to the 
needs of the populace if they know they can be criticized and sanctioned by citizens’30.  
                                                 
29
 Wheatley, S. (2010). The democratic legitimacy of international law. Bloomsbury Publishing: 80. 
30
 Ibid. 82. 
  
18 
 
 
This accountability concept has recently been talked about more extensively than ever to stress 
the importance of the institutional mechanisms for checks and balances whereby any democratic 
states exercise control and oversight over the government actions; the connection of 
accountability to the way in which governments deliver the needs of their own citizens 
(“responsiveness”); and the accountability in a way that provides a public forum to foster 
dialogue between citizens. Furthermore, it should be noted that the vehicle of this accountability 
is the legitimacy chain that can deliver the articulated will of the peoples. 
 
3.3 Legitimacy 
 
The notion of legitimacy is the broadest concept among three notions encompassing democratic 
legitimacy as well as other aspects of legitimacy. What many people have agreed upon is that a 
positive (or sociological) and a normative approach towards legitimacy can be distinguished. 
Positive legitimacy refers to the action taken by states (behavioural aspects) and the rationale 
behind compliance (or non-compliance) with an accepted norm of international law, or a 
decision made by an international institution (like WTO dispute settlement regime) or an 
international tribunal. Normative legitimacy concerns itself with ‘the principles and values which 
justify the existence of a particular norm or a legal regime
’
. Its importance lies not in the fact that 
whether a norm is accepted but whether it should be or is acceptable. As such, normative 
legitimacy pursues somewhat higher values and standards of justice and fairness by which it is to 
be cautiously decided to follow certain rules and decisions. As you can notice, the two notions 
are sometimes intertwined: Even if a rule is formally put in place, that rule will often not be 
observed if it is not perceived as legitimate from a normative angle. Likewise, the lack of 
adherence to a norm clearly demonstrates that there is a normative legitimacy deficit.
31
  
 
A more detailed distinction under the category of normative legitimacy is input legitimacy based 
on the procedures or institutional arrangements of how a rule is set forth or how a decision is 
taken, and output legitimacy based on the results of such rule or decision. Originally, the input 
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dimension of the legitimacy of international law and international institutions requires that 
sovereign member states of an organization, as parties to an agreement, give the consent. In 
recent decades, the consent of states is not sufficient and rather, procedural fairness, transparency 
and a representative decision-making process are of utmost importance. According to the latter 
model of more advanced input legitimacy, the concept is no different from that of accountability 
regarding its core elements, which will be further discussed in the later section
32
.  
 
Output legitimacy is oriented toward achieving substantive policy objectives, such as specifically 
solving pertinent problems in an effective manner and more generally serving the public interest 
through distributive justice. On this understanding, it is deeply related to the concept of 
government for the people aimed at production of global public good including international 
peace, protection of human rights, sustainable development, the fair distribution of economic 
growth, or trade liberalisation; therefore, its performance can be measured in terms of a degree to 
which the public interest is prioritized and incorporated in the government policy choices
33
. In 
this sense, it is assumed that a regime which widens inequality due to the increasing 
concentration of political power among the corporate and financial elite cannot be considered 
democratic. 
 
Although elements of input and output legitimacy can coexist and often supplement each other, 
and in particular, notions of fairness and justice involve both elements of input and output 
legitimacy, input legitimacy shares a lot more commonalities with the features of accountability 
than output legitimacy in that the former is about formal rules of representation and decision-
making procedures while the latter concerns the concrete outcomes.  
 
Based on what I have elaborated in this section, the different elements of power (authority), 
accountability and legitimacy, which are closely associated with the international democratic 
governance, are illustrated in Figure 1. Obviously, aspects of the above-stated political notions 
are neither mutually exclusive nor should they be deemed completely distinguishable from one 
another.  
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Figure 1: Dimensions and Elements of Democracy: Power (Authority), Accountability and 
Legitimacy in Global Governance  
 
 
3.4 Operationalisation of the Global Democratic Deficit: Application to International 
Organisations 
 
In relation to all these democratic concepts, what is exactly lacking and what is the public outcry 
all about when it comes to global governance and the democratisation of international 
organisations? And among those three main features explained above, which one is the most 
relevant and suitable to test the convergence/divergence around the cause and effect of a 
democratic deficit in international institutions? 
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In the wake of globalisation of regulatory functions, it created conditions where states, 
international organisations and other non-state actors claim political authority without any fixed 
constitutional framework or a set of overarching guiding principles due to the systems of 
fragmented authority at different levels (local, regional and global). According to Stutzer, A., & 
Frey, B. S.
34
,  
 
Many institutions in the area of global governance are confronted time and again with 
public protests. In particular, the meetings of international organizations such as the IMF, 
the WTO and the World Bank, and of private organizations, such as the World Economic 
Forum, have been attacked frequently by large-scale and violent protests. These protests 
get substantial coverage by the media; often as much time and space is allocated to 
reporting on the demonstrations and demonstrators as to the issues under debate at the 
official meetings. 
 
The frequent blame laid on the institutions involved in global governance is they would rather 
deliver unjust and biased solutions to the transnational problems. Among so many other 
complaints including neglect of the poor, environmental pollution, and large-scale inefficiency 
and waste of time and resources, a majority of people ‘complain about the “democratic deficit” 
of international organisations and deny the legitimacy of many representatives of the so-called 
global civil society involved in international governance. It is argued that, rather than reflecting 
“world opinion,” they represent the specific interests of the donors who fund NGO activities’35. 
 
These failures and harsh criticism have been attributable to several reasons: First, citizens of the 
states who are financially contributing to the international organisations (the principals) through 
tax payments do not sufficiently make their voices heard that can control the decisions taken by 
bureaucrats in international organisations (the agents). Second, international agreements are 
aimed at providing public goods, thereby making room for free riders. The said issue has 
worsened given the binding force of such agreements is not strong enough between sovereign 
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states. Third, ‘the delegation of competencies to international organisations and their policy-
making under current forms of democracy do not meet adequate procedural conditions to ensure 
that people in member countries feel like empowered citizens with autonomy and influence’. 
Instead, existing regulations and rules put international organisations in a very vulnerable 
position to the muscle-flexing of powerful member states, businesses, and NGOs
36
.: 
 
In essence, citizens do not (s)elect international policy-makers to represent them at the global 
level unlike what they are entitled to do in domestic politics at the national level, nor can they 
sanction them for poor performance by unseating those who should be held accountable 
through electoral defeat. As Daniel Weinstock argues, ‘elections and democratic 
representation are contingently, rather than conceptually, related to the foundational 
normative commitments of democracy’. Elections allow citizens to have control over the 
exercise of power by political elites so that those elected representatives are responsive to the 
public interests, which was depicted earlier as responsiveness as part of the accountability 
concept. Electoral politics also has an instrumental effect in keeping citizens abreast of the 
latest developments of global politics through direct participation, and in that democratic 
will-formation can be achieved through the debate taking place during the pre-election 
campaign period. Thus, ‘the absence of competitive elections to international assemblies 
impugns the political legitimacy of global regulatory norms – no elections, no democracy’37. 
In reality, the evident lack of global democratic institutions representing the true voice of the 
world citizens is seen as the world’s biggest political hurdle.  
 
3.4 Vertical Complaint: Accountability/Input Legitimacy Deficit 
 
Under these circumstances, what can be chosen for this paper as the core element of complaints 
about the global democratic deficit, especially with regard to international organisations? There 
are two broad schools of thought, both of which apply the citizen-based notion of democracy. 
One is a traditional one whose boundary is confined within the national state and which refers to 
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democracy embodied in a domestic political system. In this respect, this approach requires a 
“demos”, a defined group of population, which is self-governed and presumably exists only at 
the state level. And they are the ones who are involved in democratic governance through 
general elections or partly referenda. As such, elections and democratic representation via the 
popular vote allow them to exercise political power. As elected representatives of the will of the 
people, parliamentarians and politicians participate in the decision-making process in legislature 
based on majority voting. ‘The democratic legitimacy of an international organisation or of 
international law according to this approach rests on the link between decisions taken at the 
international level and the popular will as expressed in the general election’38. 
 
In stark contrast to this classical approach of national democracy, the principle of cosmopolitan 
democratic law stands at the other end of the spectrum. Cosmopolitan democracy does not limit 
democratic governance to the self-governing national demos. Rather, this approach is far-
reaching with the democratic decision-making process ending up in the politically empowered 
global community
39
.  
 
Both approaches attach great importance to the formal regime of decision-making and 
representation of the articulated will of the peoples. In addition to that, ‘many authors, in 
particular in the social sciences, argue that the representative platform must be supplemented by 
elements of deliberative democracy’. Deliberative democracy constitutes a crucial part of 
democratic legitimacy and governance considering the fact that the decision-making process 
takes place based on ‘the exchange of arguments (arguing)’ as opposed to the one that rests on 
‘the exchange of commitments aiming at a compromise that benefits all (bargaining)’40. 
 
Ardent supporters of deliberative democracy at the global level emphasise that an international 
organisation must be equally subject to the institutional requirements for deliberation as state-
level entities, including transparency and inclusiveness of the process for justification of any 
decision to be made. This is where accountability and input legitimacy should come into play 
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and reinforce each other to further democratise international institutions. It means that currently, 
there is no formal link between decisions at the global level and the articulation of the will of the 
people at the domestic level; therefore, international organisations require that it be equipped 
with transparency and a process of public deliberation to ensure the articulation of a “will of the 
people” and boost responsiveness to the needs of the populace. 
 
Against this background, it is clearly noted that the deficiency of accountability and input 
legitimacy is widely debated on and a focus of attention concerning the global democratic deficit 
critique taken in the literature. In relation to this, categorization made by José Alvarez is all the 
more pertinent. According to José Alvarez, the complaints that there is a democratic deficit in 
global governance are divided into three types: vertical, horizontal and ideological. ‘The vertical 
complaint concerns the relationship between global governance institutions and individual 
citizens; the horizontal complaint applies to relations between states (and between states and 
international organisations); while the ideological complaint concerns the fact that global 
governance functions to promote certain (liberal) values’. Among these, the vertical complaint is 
the most relevant to the accountability and input legitimacy deficit given there is no international 
parliament established as of yet, resulting in the fact that global governance lacks the connection 
to democratically elected polities legislating in a democratic way. Nor do international decision-
making processes seem to obtain other components indicative of constitutional democracies, 
such as the separation of powers. Simply put, the individual citizen is largely excluded from the 
international regimes
41
. 
 
3.5 Drawing on the Democratic Deficit in the European Union 
 
By the same reasoning, there was and is a similar type of critiques regarding the democratic 
credentials of the EU, which has always been cited as a shining example for the UN to follow 
down a long journey toward its genuine democratisation. The European federalists initiated a 
movement for the direct election of the European Parliament when the European Customs Union 
was finalized (1968) and another goal of achieving the Economic and Monetary Union was put 
on the European agenda. This grand project was directed toward a goal of bringing the Council 
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of Ministers, the final decision-making body, under control through an increasing intervention. 
At the time, their authority used to be immune from parliamentary scrutiny and approval. The 
aggravation of the democratic deficit of the Community can be said as a decisive factor to make 
a strong claim for direct election of the European Parliament and its empowerment
42
. 
 
Upon successful completion of this initiative, ‘elected parliamentarians developed a moral 
authority – based on electoral, democratic legitimacy- and a corporate expertise that acquired a 
“take-off” critical mass towards developing full legislative functions’. As its legislative role is 
solidified, it garnered legitimacy as a reliable institution based on its expertise. ‘Over time, the 
European Parliament (EP) developed further authority and a greater, more visible role’43. 
 
However, its evolvement was not always smooth sailing. Among many criticisms, one is about 
the relatively weak power of the EP, not commensurate with its stature as the only directly 
elected institution in the EU structure. It is highly commendable that the EP has expanded its 
frontiers covering a wide range of issue areas by the co-decision procedure, symbolizing its 
equal legislative power with the Council; however, the EP’s influence is still limited in many 
other areas and its role is secondary under the consultation procedure. In a widely cited article 
Models of Democracy: Elite Attitudes and the Democratic Deficit in the European Union, 
Richard Katz ‘equals the democratic deficit as the weakness of the European Parliament as the 
only directly elected EU institution and the inability of the EP to hold the European executive 
accountable to it in a manner comparable to national governments’44.  
 
Katz highlights two main attributes of a democracy: one is ‘popular sovereignty which translates 
the will of the people into concrete action’; and the other is ‘the model party government’ where 
elected officials are accountable to the electorates through parties and make major political 
decisions accordingly. On both terms, the EU has not shown positive results. Although an 
attempt was made to elevate the competence of the European Parliament in nineteen policy areas 
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vis-a-vis the Council with the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty, sceptics point out that most of 
these expanded areas involve only second order policies. Again, the democratic deficit concerns 
about the EU boil down to the lack of full accountability and input legitimacy. Nevertheless, ‘for 
all its feebleness and faults, the parliament is surely an essential counterweight to the unelected 
Commission and the photocopy democracy of the European Council’45. 
 
However, to worsen the situation, the highly sensitive policies concerning almost all parts of 
Europe, such as immigration, currency, economic and security-related issues, are being hotly 
debated and formulated with little input from the showcase parliament in Strasbourg, and a lower 
level of voter turnout and general interest in Euro-parliament elections. This unwinding of once 
tightly knit European community bodes ill for the establishment of a global polity since the EU is 
unlikely to let a worldwide political body or legislature, if created at all, make any decision in 
favour of binding international rules on migration of people possible given such an international 
regime may enable Arab, African, and South Asian representatives to outvote the EU. 
 
3.6 Dependent Variable: International Parliamentary Body as Accountability Mechanism 
As the EU case rightly demonstrates, one mechanism for the democratisation of global politics 
would be the establishment of parliamentary-type institutions. At the domestic level, national 
parliaments legislate within a constitutional framework; hold the executive to account; provide a 
forum for democratic debate; and, in parliamentary democracies, demonstrate an expression of 
the will of the people building up to the establishment of an executive government. Where 
international organisations conduct a regulatory function, the parliamentary principle associated 
with the practice of democracy suggests a requirement to establish an (directly) elected assembly 
that would both adopt international law norms and hold the regulatory power-wielders to 
account
46
.  
 
The development of parliamentary settings or institutions transcending national borders can be 
referred to as ‘transnational parliamentarisation’. An increased parliamentarization of global 
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governance is in line with the cosmopolitan idea of democracy and helps facilitate public input 
into global deliberative processes. In so doing, the creation of a worldwide parliament, consisting 
of democratically elected members who exert a substantial amount of influence on the rule-
making and the budgetary issues of the relevant organization (i.e. the UN), is an end goal. At a 
lower level, another way of achieving transnational parliamentarisation is to establish a 
parliamentary assembly to an international organization. They are formal bodies of an 
international organisation existing next to or within an organ that is constituted by the 
governments of states and a common institution, such as a Commission. These assemblies are 
mainly in charge of transnational deliberation of the decisions of the respective organization yet 
have no formal power to participate in the decision-making process. However, the EP example 
vindicates that such limitation does not completely rid those assemblies of the chance of gaining 
more power as there is a growing number of demands for greater democratic legitimacy in 
international organisations. As illustrated earlier in this paper, parliamentary assemblies can 
serve as a springboard to reach to the highest level of transnational parliamentarisation, which is 
the set-up of a worldwide parliament
47
. 
 
To name a few existing parliamentary assemblies associated with different organisations but still 
restricted only to a regional level, the Andean Parliament, the MERCOSUR Parliament or Pan-
African Parliament of the African Union, the parliamentary assemblies of NATO, of the Council 
of Europe, and of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) or the 
ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly are notable examples
48
. 
 
In this fragmented world of regulation, the responsibility for global regulation is divided between 
some 250 international organisations and institutions that differ in the scale and priorities of their 
tasks. However, only forty five of them have parliamentary assemblies, with representation often 
reflecting the size of population of the relevant Member State. Anne Peters argues that the most 
powerful international organisations and institutions should be ‘parliamentarised’, although she 
advises against the realistic possibility that a global parliamentary assembly can provide effective 
political oversight: their importance hinges on exposing international organisations to greater 
                                                 
47 Krajewski, M. (2010). Legitimizing global economic governance through transnational parliamentarization: The 
parliamentary dimensions of the WTO and the World Bank: 16. 
48 Ibid.  
  
28 
 
transparency and public scrutiny, contestation and debate, and in promoting ‘political dialogue at 
the level of [domestic] parliaments, political parties, and civil society’49. 
 
4. Analysis and Findings 
 
4.1 Looking through the Constructivist Lens: Norm Dynamics 
 
As delineated earlier in the theoretical framework section, I will firstly take a constructivist 
approach and focus on the role of norm entrepreneurs in the proliferation of the democratic 
legitimacy critiques of the UN to ensure that both the concerns regarding a democratic deficit at 
the international level as well as causal beliefs are shared by a broad range of professionals and 
expert communities, so that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, norm 
cascades, and internalization. To this end, I am going to carry out the content and discourse 
analysis on secondary sources titled the Pre-1950-2014 Selected Quotes on Global Democracy 
and a World Parliament (available at 
http://www.unpacampaign.org/documents/en/QUOTATIONS.pdf). The secondary sources to be 
examined are statements, speeches, motions, opinion articles and comments regarding the global 
democratic deficit and why they think the time is ripe for creating a UN Parliamentary Assembly 
made partly by former and incumbent global leaders (e.g. Members of the European Parliament 
(EP), Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the EP, President of the EP, Vice-
President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, President of the Parliament 
of Mercosur, etc.) over the span of pre-1950s up to 2014. The list also includes high-ranking 
officials from the relevant organisations as well as professionals and intellectuals that are 
grouped together as epistemic communities (‘a network of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue area’50). In the previous years, the European Parliament 
has endorsed the creation of such a UN Parliamentary Assembly and it is supported by hundreds 
of Members of the European Parliament and similar support groups across the world.  
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As mentioned before, by observing those cited quotes that offer us a general account of what has 
been discussed on this specific topic during the given period, I will analyse whether the members 
of a “potential” epistemic community, who already have a set of shared concerns about the 
problem in these selected quotes and thus collectively advocate the ultimate goal of establishing 
a world parliament, also reach a consensus on cause and effect relationships of the given problem 
and the parts which constitute the problem, based upon which I will try to examine if they 
converge or diverge on casual beliefs.  
 
What I want to explore now is 154 quotes by approximately 110 people (high-ranking officials, 
political leaders, experts and intellectuals in academia who are influential enough to become a 
norm entrepreneur group). As the Appendix I in this paper documents, there have been various 
individuals and groups over the past 50 years who have advocated a second assembly or world 
parliament, and, indeed, continue to do so. At the outset, it is assumed that they are all 
convergent on the idea of establishing a UN Parliamentary Assembly with a common 
understanding of the issues as the title of this source is self-explanatory (the Pre-1950-2014 
Selected Quotes on Global Democracy and a World Parliament).  
 
Again, my operationalisation of the global democratic deficit (of international organisations) is 
focused on the "accountability" and “input legitimacy” deficit with the application of democratic 
principles of citizen representation and direct accountability. Since they all share the concerns of 
the issue concerned and solution (parliamentarisation of the UN to solve its underlying 
problems), it becomes easier to search for whether their causal beliefs (definitions) of the 
problem are converged upon those two specific sets of democratic deficits (accountability and 
input legitimacy).  
 
If one were deemed to converge around these two concepts, their quotes should include at least 
one of the following words or expressions based on the conceptualisation I made in the 
methodology section regarding the relevant political notions of democracy (also see Figure 1): 
“Subject to the will of the people, citizen participation, elected body by the people, monitoring or  
oversight of the executive, checks and balances on the government, input legitimacy as 
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participatory notions of government by the people, as opposed to output legitimacy, elected 
officials or assembly, transparency, opportunities for participation in decision-making processes, 
access to information, reasoned decision-making through representatives, deliberative democracy 
(deliberation), accountability and democratic control”.  
 
On the other hand, if one diverged from reasoning about accountability by believing that power 
(authority), another forms of legitimacy or any other reason are the main obstacle to 
democratising global governance, they would use other expressions than suggested as above in 
their statements. Nevertheless, as some aspects of the concepts are overlapping with each other, 
there is certainly a very large grey area in the relationships. Hence, one cannot guarantee that a 
clear-cut line is always drawn between what is exactly power, accountability and legitimacy as I 
already stated that different notions share many common aspects. Furthermore, the quotes are not 
given in their entirety but only as an excerpt, which may make us miss some important clue. 
 
By using a unique list of selected quotes on global democracy and a world parliament compiled 
by the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly (CEUNPA) to construct a measure of 
convergence or divergence of potential epistemic communities that directly reflects their causal 
beliefs about the global democratic deficit and thus conduct comprehensive analysis of norm 
dynamics from the constructivist theory.  
 
For each quote in the data, we have the partial content of the entire text or statement, the name of 
commentator, the title (position) of that person, the venue where he or she made a statement, and 
the date and time of the statement. This list contains 154 quotes covering approximately 130 
alleged members of potential norm entrepreneurs, some of whom either made more than one 
comment during a different time period or spoke on behalf an organisation. The time span is 
from pre-1950 to 2014. A given quote is usually a short declarative statement about a UN 
Parliamentary Assembly or a democratic deficit in global governance or international institutions.  
 
I use the excel program to list and count the number of key words that are presented as a reason 
why each individual has inevitably come to the same conclusion on the need for a UNPA. I 
identify whether the language matches with any of the constituent elements of accountability and 
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input legitimacy deficit. For example, the statement “The strengthening of the United Nations 
will only be achieved by the participation of direct representatives of the citizens in the decision‐
making process. The setting up of a Global Parliamentary Assembly is fundamental for the 
functioning of democracy today” was made by Vasso Papandreou, former minister and former 
member of the European Commission from Greece, on October 2013. It contains the word 
“direct representatives of the citizens in the decision-making process” which unconditionally I 
would assume has an accountability connotation. This identification refers to samples of the 
expression or phrase I handpicked based on the operationsalisation made in the earlier 
methodology section (e.g. will of the people, citizen participation, elected body, etc.) as a 
guideline to more accurately classify information. Overall, the results in the next section provide 
strong evidence on the factors that drive the divergence and convergence of norm entrepreneurs’ 
opinions around this specific cause and effect relationships of a global democratic deficit. 
 
 
4.1.1 Text (content and discourse) Analysis  
 
The following table demonstrates that almost all epistemic members (approximately 130 experts, 
professionals, MPs, public officials and high-profile global leaders) converge on the similar 
causal beliefs about what caused a global democratic deficit, namely the lack of accountability 
and input legitimacy.  
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Figure 2: A breakdown list of the reasons cited for the accountability deficit in international 
organisations (i.e. the UN) and other causes among 154 quotes delivered by 111 members of a 
potential epistemic community regarding democratization of the international institutions (Out of 
a total of 154 quotes, only 7 people cited either unclear or general reasons for the pending 
problem, such as UN reform, world peace, protection of human rights and resolution of common 
challenges of mankind including environmental degradation.) 
 
4.2 Analysis from Realism and Neoliberal Institutionalism 
 
As illustrated before, although it apparently seems that alleged norm entrepreneurs seek to bring 
new ideas, norms, and discourses into policy debates at the global level and are found to show a 
great degree of convergence mostly agreed upon cause and effect relationships of the problem 
and how to fix it; however, community members and key policy-makers failed to act upon the 
norm as of yet. According to the conventional wisdom, once a great number of activists are 
convinced of the need for a global parliament or a worldwide parliamentary assembly, as we 
have witnessed in the table showing their general consensus on severity of the accountability and 
input legitimacy deficit in international organisations, especially the UN, follow-up measures 
have yet to be undertaken and there is still a long way to go to ensure the project’s fruition. 
While launching a global parliamentary assembly in the UN is still assumed to be a plausible 
idea, I would say that the very practical challenge of reaching that level is understandably very 
daunting to the extent that many activists, albeit sympathetic to the idea in theory, will likely 
withdraw their support eventually because of their firm belief that this goal is such a remote 
possibility.  
 
If they are right, what are the factors that block the spread of this new norm for the time being? 
The other two theories – realism and neo-liberal institutionalism – elaborated in the earlier 
section can lend us help to explain the rationale behind such hindrance.  
 
According to Peter Haas, there are four criteria that any given epistemic community should meet:  
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The first two criteria were those I have been using to test my hypothesis (a shared set of concerns 
and shared causal beliefs about the global democratic deficit problem), while the other two have 
yet to be explained. To elaborate the remaining two requirements:  
 
Third, community members should converge around shared notions of validity, that is, 
intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the 
domain of their expertise. Finally, community members should come up with a common 
policy enterprise - a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which 
their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human 
welfare will be enhanced as a result
51
. 
 
4.2.1 The Lack of Consensus among UN Members to Include a Formal Parliamentary 
Dimension in the UN System: Realism 
 
Zooming in on the UN Member States as community members, they would not converge around 
shared notions of validity of a UNPA and it is highly unlikely that such a parliament will evolve 
in the foreseeable future, because the dominant powers, such as the United States, are hardly 
expected to break away from the principle of sovereignty, which to them, amounts to 
undermining democracy in the absence of adoption or affirmation by domestic legislatures.  
 
John McGinnis observes that international law, treaty or any kind of arrangements are accepted 
as binding between states, not peoples, and there is not much reason to assume that it should 
overturn the judgements made by democratic deliberations in particular states. On this note, 
realists and sceptics of a new norm think the problem for democracy can be solved by a re-
affirmation of the national sovereignty, requiring the consent of states to any emerging norm
52
. 
 
Moreover, the executive branch of government retains the upper hand with respect to 
international law and governance because states make a set of rules and comply with obligations, 
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compared to the legislative and judicial branches, at the expense of separation of powers and 
legislative checks and balances.  
 
In a similar vein, these new Sovereigntist claims to international law and global governance can 
be applied to the rational choice approach of Goldsmith and Posner whereby international law is 
explained in terms of ‘states acting rationally to maximise their interests, given their perceptions 
of the interests of others states and the distribution of state power’. In this regard, interaction 
between states can be categorized into four different patterns of behaviour: ‘coincidence of 
interest’, by which an individual state acts in its best interest in disregard for other states within 
the framework of bilateral inter-state relations; ‘coordination’, through which states are better off 
in the coordination equilibrium (identical or symmetrical action) than they otherwise might be in 
its absence; ‘cooperation’, based on which states mutually move away from actions that would 
otherwise be in their self-interests to receive greater medium- and to longer term benefits; and 
coercion, which follows when a weaker state is forced by a powerful state to act against its best 
interests
53
. 
 
Among these four, coercion seems more persuasive than the others to explain the fact that a huge 
body of international legislation, such as UN legislature, IMF assembly, OECD congress or 
World Bank parliament, has yet to come into existence thus far. At present, they are deeply 
inegalitarian in that such institutions do not legislate in ways that serve the best interests of those 
affected by transplanetary governance and do not employ international norms in a fair and 
impartial way, since they are dominated by a small number of powerful states.  
 
As such, these global regulatory agencies are susceptible to being used as a hegemonic 
instrument or a useful tool for wealthy and powerful states to prioritize their national interests 
over many other urgent needs as they are able to ‘use their greater bargaining power to shape and 
reshape this order in their own favour. International law agreements concerning trade, 
investments, intellectual property, and the use of common resources can be shaped to be more or 
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less favourable to various affected parties and, in particular, shaped to be more favourable to 
affluent societies (and their citizens and corporations)’54. 
 
A clear example was when former US President George Bush engaged in the war of Afghanistan 
in the name of the fight against terrorism to save the civilized world. Despite the fact that his 
attack on Afghanistan was legalized by the UN Security Council (UNSC), it is a flagrant 
violation of the Chapter 7 of the UN Charter stipulating that “Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against 
a Member of the United Nations”, which does not imply anything about subsequent retaliation. 
However, five permanent members of the Security Council, the so-called world leaders, tend to 
define their powers according to their preferences, not in line with the world’s best interests. An 
inconsistent pattern of engagement evidenced by large-scale interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, but not in Rwanda, Sudan and Tajikistan. This is the latest manifestation of the ongoing 
crisis of legitimacy which concerns every global decision-making body. The Group of 8 (G8) is 
another example: Critics of the G8 have accused the body of representing the interests of an elite 
group of industrialised nations, to the detriment of the needs of the wider world, while making up 
just 13 percent of the world’s population. They were all called upon to seek domestic imperatives: 
‘their global role is simply an unmandated by-product of their national role’55. 
 
In addition, contrary to the arguments for arguing rather than bargaining in deliberative 
democracy illustrated earlier, negotiators usually fail to realize the best solution by convincing 
each other through rational dialogue; rather, they make commitments in some areas in exchange 
for concessions from their counterparts in their key areas. A case in point is that WTO 
negotiators pursue “package deals” aimed only at striking compromises, but not integrating 
different interests into a common framework. ‘The principle of “dout des” is a principle of 
contract-making but not of deliberation and rational discourse’56.  
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Voting power in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is based on a quota 
system and votes are determined by the level of a nation's financial contribution, but they are 
governed by the countries in which they don’t operate. The UN General Assembly represents 
governments rather than people and, while each country has the same one vote in the General 
Assembly (GA) and most of its subsidiary bodies (one-country-one-vote), in practice the weight 
of a poor nation of 700 million population is trivial compared to a rich nation of only 40 million. 
And there is a long distance between UN Ambassadors and the populations the former are 
appointed to represent the latter. Rich nations are sending a very large group of business 
lobbyists, whereas some poor countries cannot even afford to dispatch a small group of 
representatives to WTO meetings where many of the key decisions are made based on bargaining, 
oftentimes in secret. Decision-making at the WTO often does not meet the criterion of a rational 
discourse and deliberation defined as a process of exchanging arguments in order to convince 
each other. 
 
The radical camp of reformers of international organisations, such as NGOs and many 
campaigners, demands at most the replacement of the World Bank and IMF, not reaching as far 
as fundamentally addressing the internal dynamics of a political system that legitimize them. 
This passive act is tantamount to turning a blind eye to abuses of rich and powerful states as they 
govern the world on behalf of the rest of the world. In those countries’ opinion, accepting the 
idea of launching a global parliamentary assembly for transnational democracy means losing 
vested power interests that can ensure that the world is ruled for their benefit
57
. 
However, despite the fact that nation states will be reluctant to relinquish their (illegitimate) 
control over global governance, it’s not a question of removing further powers from them or 
from their citizens, but of democratizing those powers and political authority which are already 
being exercised supranationally. 
 
4.2.2 The Lack of Consensus among UN Members to Include a Formal Parliamentary 
Dimension in the UN system: Neoliberal Institutionalism 
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Regarding neo-liberal institutionalism, which also backs up why the new norm seemingly failed 
to cascade down, Krisch admits that the Global Administrative Law project puts emphasis on a 
liberal  idea of the rule of law
58
:  
 
Focusing on the accountability (and thus largely on constraints) of existing institutions 
may overemphasise the threat these institutions pose at the expense of more positive, 
liberal or republican visions that see them as forms and fora for realizing self-government 
or non-domination. 
 
In the same framework, input-oriented (participatory) concepts of democracy alone do not create 
legitimacy due to the problem of self-interested majority-rule. Thus, political legitimacy are 
accepted only to the extent that it can promote the general welfare of the community concerned
59
. 
As a result, the delegation of policy-making to a global level tends to produce better, “less 
political”, policy choices, given that elected governments are very keen to keep their power and 
get reelected in forthcoming elections and thus are highly unlikely to implement policies amid 
(short-term) strong public opposition. However, since the government cannot always bind its 
successors, public policy is prone to take an unexpected turn, and therefore lack[s] credibility
60
. 
 
Peter Lindseth makes the point that
61
: 
 
All international organisations share a similar telos: to overcome a coordination or 
collective action problem. A supranational administration must balance the sovereign 
interests of member states against the broader interest of the membership as a whole: In 
the constitutionalist logic of supranational delegation, the abstract “membership at large” 
takes on the role of the legitimate political principal in the system, and it is to this 
abstraction that supranational agents are supposed to owe their loyalty. It follows that any 
presumption in favour of a particular member (or members), even if justified on 
democratic legitimacy grounds, is “constitutionally” inappropriate. 
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Despite the relentless pursuit of general welfare or common interest while respecting the 
principle of sovereign equality of states, the growing scope of international organisations’ efforts 
to regulate the actions of states (and increasingly individuals), and the intrusiveness of some 
organisations into areas originally under the jurisdiction of another country or sovereignty has 
sparked renewed interest in the legitimacy of international organisations and their actions over 
the last two decades.   
It has also led to measuring the performance and success of international organisations through 
the lens of legitimacy at a time when they have become increasingly criticized for not fully 
respecting the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of their Members States in the 
form of diplomatic and military interventions, for instance by the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
NATO, and the UN Security Council. These debates have largely focused on the role of 
international organisations in regard to the authorization of the use of force, and the legitimacy of 
the use of force without the authorization by international organisations, especially the UN, 
particularly in the context of the wars in Kosovo and Iraq in 1999 and 2003 respectively. 
Moreover, many of the underlying beliefs and norms on which the legitimacy of international 
organisations were founded have been challenged by the rapid global political and social change. 
As Veijo Heiskanen has argued
62
:  
Over the past fifty years, fundamental changes have taken place in the operating 
environment of these international organisations...As a result of these changes, many 
international organisations...have been struggling to maintain or re-establish the role that 
they once were perceived, or expected to have in international relations. 
In contemporary international society, ‘characterized by value pluralism and a diverse range of 
actors (both states and non-state actors), international organisations seeking legitimacy have to 
address a range of distinct audiences with different interests, expectations, and normative 
reference points, and face the difficulty of reconciling these competing demands’. The heated 
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debate about the EU’s democratic deficit is a case in point of such conflicting opinions where 
European elites and bureaucrats may have been the primary actors in successfully legitimating 
the EU and its institutions, but the general population of the EU’s Member States have failed to 
do so. ‘Similarly, the literature on international peace operations has increasingly focused on the 
tensions between international and local legitimacy’63.  
Due to these audience issues, international organisations are faced with three specific challenges, 
also having an impact on their collective and pluralist legitimation practices. First, processes of 
social and political change can create legitimacy gaps as the objectives and practices of an 
organisation no longer coincide with the normative beliefs and expectations of its members. 
‘Such transformation, however, tends to affect different states in different ways, depending on 
their internal characteristics, their economic or military capacity, or their geopolitical position. 
Thus, rather than simply depriving international organisations of their normative underpinnings, 
political and normative change opens them up for contestation again, as the expectations of 
member states towards the organisation diverge, or because previously existing differences come 
into the open’64. 
 
Most notably, the case of the UN Security Council reveals how divisive opinions can be about 
the principles of the international order that the organisation was widely expected to uphold over 
the last decade: ‘whether they should promote a liberal “solidarist” vision that rests on a 
commitment to individual human rights, or the more restrictive “pluralist” order that emphasizes 
sovereign equality and non-intervention’. For those states concerned to protect sovereignty, the 
Security Council’s coercive nature of involving deeper in the domestic affairs of its Member 
States, based on a wider interpretation of what constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security, is downgrading the legitimacy of the organisation
65
.  
 
On the other hand, for those states supporting a more liberal interpretation, the failure to 
challenge the sovereignty for the sake of human rights protection does more harm to the 
legitimacy of the UNSC. ‘The normative fissures within the membership of international 
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organisations, and the existence of multiple internal audiences for legitimacy claims on 
behalf of international organisations, highlight the importance of considering international 
organisations not only as actors legitimating other actors and practices, or as institutions in 
need of legitimation, but also as frameworks for contesting and legitimating different 
international orders’66.  
 
Such normative contestation in the international organization like the UN, which is supposed 
to contribute towards the betterment of mankind, moves us further away from cooperating on 
the introduction of elective politics at a global level to oversee international institutions and 
guide international policymaking. If the ongoing UN reform movement were in any way 
relevant to this debate, is it conducive enough to the democratisation of international 
organisations, principally through the application of the parliamentary principle of 
democracy? 
 
 
4.3 Limitation to UN Reform: UN Security Council 
 
Any bureaucratic agencies tend to hold onto power through self-preservation, including the tasks 
of its members. Applying this tendency to the UN, it will slow down the process of the 
institutional reform being made via an expansion of the UN’s role, and this is the reason why 
governments cannot be trusted because their true intentions and real commitment about the 
reform of the UN are questionable.  
 
In the reform process, Members of the non-aligned movement have constantly raised awareness 
of the underrepresentation of a significant portion of the world in the UN Security Council 
(UNSC), and the concomitant democratic deficit of an institution with the five permanent 
members’ (P5) power of veto, which more often than not serves only to block decisions adverse 
to those five, or even only one of them.  
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As global opinion polls have shown, this perception of an unrepresentative Council dominated 
by a few great powers resonates with public opinion in countries across the world. Such 
challenges to the UNSC seem to have been the subject of considerable debate on institutional 
legitimacy among scholars for many years, with special attention to its decision-making 
processes, effectiveness, or the degree to which it incorporates shared values into policy-making. 
Both scholars and decision-makers continue to assert their significant role in the legitimation of 
global actions to tackle threats posed to international peace, security and justice while 
experiencing the deep normative split among Member States over controversial issues, such as 
defining the scope of the international Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 
 
‘While the UNSC has an identity greater than the sum of its parts, its decision-making structures 
and processes, along with its capacity to implement those decisions, are more ad hoc than its 
characterization as a coherent body suggests’. As repeatedly highlighted, at the moment many 
developing countries view UNSC as a club of powerful nations for exercising their own interests, 
rather than playing by rule in an even-handed manner. The Council retains the exclusive 
discretion regarding what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, which makes it 
distinguished from other formal bureaucracies that are mostly issue-specific. The retention of 
UNSC discretion indicates that the Council takes on a more political character and consequently 
becomes vulnerable to external political influence, running counter to an understanding that the 
ability to appear depoliticized is the key to the legitimacy of international organisations
67
. 
 
Therefore, the Council has a dual nature in terms of its legitimation efforts: its mandate to appeal 
to different audiences, and the different priorities of its key members. Due to these constraints, it 
is never an easy task for the Council and its Member States to provide a good justification to 
promote their legitimacy claims. Not only are Council members conscious of the legitimacy 
challenges they currently face, but also they make concrete efforts to resolve these issues 
although it rarely happens. Whenever the Council collectively deliberates on its role, namely its 
annual retreat for new members or its summit meetings, Member States occasionally come up 
with a possible way to enhance the Council’s legitimacy68.   
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This self-assessment and reflection on key elements of a legitimacy hiccup is driven by three 
factors:  First, the world has witnessed dramatic transformations in the composition of the global 
society and a sharp rise in the membership of developing countries coupled with the emergence 
of new powers including China, India and Brazil over the past six decades or so. It has been 
argued that these new changes require the Council to reflect realities of a paradigm shift. Second, 
the resulting exponential growth of workload that the Council needs to handle causes a large 
burden. Members convene several times a week for regular sessions and consultations, and also 
have to attend the increasing number of subsidiary bodies, such as committees on sanctions. This 
heavier workload puts pressure especially on smaller countries with small missions in New York. 
Third, the UNSC has expanded the scope of its activities since it has become increasingly 
involved in domestic affairs of Member States with its subsidiary organs assuming a more 
operational role, including the management and oversight of sanctions regimes. Accordingly, 
there have been calls to implement structural reforms, which leads to enlargement within the 
Council and ‘achieving wider representation and participation in Council business, greater 
effectiveness, and greater transparency and accountability’69. 
 
As such, internal structural reform, including five key issues: categories of membership, the 
question of the veto held by the five permanent members, regional representation, the size of an 
enlarged Council and its working methods, and the Security Council-General Assembly 
relationship, seems to be higher on agenda at this moment than addressing overall legitimacy gap 
and democratic deficit of the entire UN system. In 2005, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
called on the UN to reach a consensus on expanding the council to 24 members, in a plan 
referred to as "In Larger Freedom", which is a culmination of continuing efforts for Council 
enlargement and reform of the veto. However, little progress has been made thus far, as it is hard 
to reach political consensus on who should be included as part of this enlarged Council as a new 
permanent member. A more fundamental question arises as to whether these reforms would  ever 
be able to reach the ultimate goal of increasing the democratic legitimacy of the UN in the 
current international political landscape.  
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Such proposal is based on the assumption that the Council’s problem stems from its composition 
instead of the complex nature of many pending issues at stake and the inherent limitations 
Member States encounter when handling them, is not supported by the Council’s record. 
Furthermore, the prospects of a reshaped and expanded permanent membership ever being able 
to reach more consensus than before remains very much unclear.  
 
For instance, when the Council was reconfigured in 2011, it has decided to include Germany, 
Brazil, India and South Africa, which had long aspired to become a permanent member of the 
UNSC, as part of its membership. However, this organ remained politically divisive on sensitive 
issues such as the Syrian crisis, where no unified response was ever agreed upon. Even if 
Resolutions were passed, these so-called aspirants expressed deep concerns over the appropriate 
role of the Council regarding intervention in domestic affairs of its sovereign Member States, 
albeit deemed as humanitarian crises.  
 
4.4 The Role of the IPU in Progress of the Norm Life Cycle (in relation to the UN) 
 
In addition to the UN reform that has failed to hit the right target (reducing a global democratic 
deficit), it would be worthwhile paying close attention to the statements and speeches delivered 
by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) established in 1889, which is the sole organisation that 
represents the legislative branch of governments on a global scale and consists of 167 Member 
Parliaments and 10 Associate Members, serving as the focal point for worldwide parliamentary 
dialogue and for the firm establishment of representative democracy. Its official statements (e.g. 
declarations) can be used as primary sources to gauge whether UN’s relationship with other 
international organisations and the discourse on the democratic deficiency developed thereof 
actually helped or blocked the promotion of the new norm of establishing a UN Parliamentary 
Assembly., At the outset,.  
 
In association with the UN, the IPU had not had any formal relationship with this world 
organisation until the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, however, the cooperation between the 
IPU and the UN was dramatically improved. The close working relationship between the IPU 
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and the UN has led to an increasing visibility of the parliamentary dimension in discussions 
about the contemporary world order.  
 
The IPU has put forward a vision and made efforts in earnest in 1995 when the IPU held a 
special session of its governing council, the Inter-Parliamentary Council, in the UN General 
Assembly Hall on the occasion of the 50
th
 Anniversary of the establishment of the UN. A 
declaration was adopted after the meeting, pledging the closer working relationship between the 
UN and national parliaments as well as the IPU as a facilitator. This declaration also paved the 
way for forging a formal agreement between the UN and the IPU so that the latter can play a 
larger role in carrying out the political work of the former as clearly laid out in its conclusion
70
.  
 
...to define a new relationship with the world organization of parliaments, mirroring at 
the international level the relationship which exists at the national level between 
government and the parliament; a timely exercise when high priority is given to 
democracy and good governance. 
 
A series of efforts of the promoting closer collaboration between the UN and the respective 
national parliaments of its Member States through the IPU (as the member countries of the two 
organisations overlap to a large degree) culminated in the conclusion of a formal agreement of 
cooperation, taking the already existing bilateral cooperation to the next level, followed by 
gathering of the first-ever conference of parliaments represented through their Speakers, 
Presidents or Presiding Officers attended by some 150 heads of parliaments on 30 August to 1 
September 2000. 
 
A week thereafter, the UN Millennium Declaration reiterates in its paragraph 30
71
 the 
significance of relations between the UN and national parliaments, and enhances such co-
operation through the IPU. Yet another success of this relationship resulted in the passionate 
debate about the creation of the “second assembly” of the UN, which could be represented by the 
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IPU, and which might evolve into a global parliament in the future. ‘The prospects for the latter 
scenario are remote, but the case of the cooperation between the IPU and the UN shows that a 
working relationship of the IPU with the largest inter-governmental organisation can be 
established and can produce results’72.  
 
...strengthen cooperation between the United Nations and national parliaments, through 
their world organisation the Inter-Parliamentary Union, in a variety of fields, including 
peace and security, economic and social development, international law and human 
rights, democracy and gender issues. 
 
They regard the establishment of a global parliament, unicameral or bicameral, as a finish line, 
but as noted above recommend starting with a second assembly which, like the European 
Parliament, would act in an advisory consulting capacity that would develop into an authoritative 
political organ. 
 
In so doing, it was often suggested to use the International Parliamentary Union (IPU) as a 
stepping stone and its process whereby existing parliaments select other parliamentarians as the 
members for a new assembly. As a significant figure within IPU, Roche has shown extensive 
support for this process and provides a full discussion of why that would be feasible. Despite the 
advantages he documents, Anders Johnsson, who is the longest serving (a total of 16 years) 
Secretary-General of the IPU and thus seen as the most influential figure of this organisation, has 
a different vision in his mind.  
 
As a counter-argument, the former IPU Secretary-General made it clear in his contributed 
article
73
, about what it says and for what it omits in the section of the UN Millennium 
Declaration regarding the parliamentary dimension of international cooperation. ‘In the latter 
category falls the idea of a parliamentary assembly for the United Nations. There is no reference 
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to it, not because it was not discussed during the preparatory process but because it found no 
proponents amongst the participants’74. 
 
Although many people assume that “a UN Parliamentary Assembly would not replace or 
duplicate the Inter‐Parliamentary Union's functions, and that a UNPA would provide a response 
to the democratic deficit in global governance which the IPU in its current structure is unable to 
offer”,75  former IPU Secretary-General Johnsson emphasises that the IPU, equally active, has 
taken the view that no new structures are desired or needed. Existing parliamentary organisations 
can perfectly well meet the need. The IPU can also increasingly and more systematically provide 
a platform for the United Nations to interact directly with parliaments and their members.  
 
His final remarks in this article as follows are a clear indication of the fact that the IPU is not a 
huge supporter of an international legislature in the UN
76
: 
 
Finally, the IPU also believes that the Organisation can play a particularly important role 
in certain peace-building and peacekeeping operations since it has particular expertise in 
organising support from national parliaments for building and strengthening democratic 
structures. All of the above may well be a far cry from international parliamentary 
assemblies attached to the United Nations, WTO and others. 
 
4.5 Alternative Explanation 
Turning back to the concept of “legitimacy” referred to above when talking about the democratic 
deficit of the UN since the legitimacy of a political and social system stems from the willingness 
of people to obey those who hold power because they have a high level of trust in them. 
Advocates of democracy claim that a free and fair election of those who hold power is the most 
desirable and effective means of guaranteeing legitimacy
77
. But it is not just political freedoms 
that create legitimacy. The vast majority of followers of democracy also accept that, unless it 
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also delivers a sufficient amount of socio-economic benefits over time to larger sections of 
population, its ability to create and sustain legitimacy will be damaged (mainly output 
legitimacy)
78
. 
 
In regards to this, I am going to suggest as an alternative explanation that it is deemed valuable 
for future studies to conduct quantitative analyses on “Global Public Opinion Toward the United 
Nations: Insights from Gallup World Poll”79 among many other regular cross-national public 
opinion surveys measuring attitudes toward the UN (among other topics relating to foreign 
policy and international politics). The latter ones are undertaken by WorldPublicOpinion.org, the 
Pew Global Attitudes Project of the Pew Research Centre and the Global Views Program of the 
Chicago Council on Global Affairs respectively, which can be used as a basis to objectively 
investigate the approval and perception of citizens regarding global policy outcomes generated 
by the United Nations.  
 
All the survey results to be considered demonstrate that clear majorities of the surveyed have a 
favourable view of the UN, albeit the presence of some regional and within-country factional 
variations. These results (overall high approval ratings of the UN job performance) serve as an 
important source to test realism and neo-liberal institutionalism further  because although many 
have oftentimes criticized the UN and other international institutions for being “undemocratic” 
per se due to the deeply political nature whereby they operate decision-making processes behind 
closed doors without being subjected to parliamentary controls, it is assumed that ‘individual 
citizens would have few incentives to try to monitor governments’ behaviour. Indeed, the larger 
the polity, the more individuals can rationally be ignorant, since each person’s actions have so 
little effect on policies. That is, the very size of a global polity would create significant incentive 
problems for voters – in mass election campaigns it would seem pointless to most voters to 
invest in acquiring information when one’s own vote would count for so little’80.  
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In tandem with this, it is highly advisable to do the following research activity at a later date: To 
see if there is any causal link between the approval ratings of the UN job performance (especially 
those who disapprove the UN) and people’s quest for more democracy and a global 
parliamentary assembly (if the rationale behind their disapproval is cited as the institution’s 
democratic deficit), one can assess an international opinion poll about democracy by the 
Campaign for the Establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (CEUNPA). This 
organisation is a global network of more than 270 NGOs and 700 parliamentarians from around 
140 countries devoted to establishing a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly. The poll was 
conducted during the similar periods to those of the polls about the public attitudes toward the 
UN mentioned earlier. Interviewees were asked how likely they would “support a global 
parliament, where votes are based on country population sizes, and the global parliament is able 
to make binding policies”. I will leave such close investigation of a series of public opinion polls 
to future studies as it falls outside the scope of my paper. 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
To be sure, contemporary globalisation has faced an urgent need for much more transnational 
regulatory authority, and the widening scope of global governance observed within the past half-
century is expected to continue into the future. With such fragmented authority at local, regional 
and global levels, a democracy gap in international institutions has increased and thus demands 
for democratic participation in and public accountability of global regulatory institutions will 
remain strong. Yet thus far no global-scale regulatory agency, namely within the United Nations, 
which is the largest international decision-making body, has shown any sign of including a 
parliamentary dimension to it, although there are approximately 45 parliamentary assemblies 
established only at the regional level, such as the Andean Parliament, the MERCOSUR 
Parliament or Pan-African Parliament of the African Union, the parliamentary assemblies of 
NATO, of the Council of Europe, and of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) or the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly. 
 
To identify specific causes of why a global parliament has not come into being despite so many 
criticisms and an increase in calls for the need for an international legislature, I used three 
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different theoretical frameworks – constructivism, realism and neoliberal institutionalism to 
explore the factors that have had an effect on the progress of democratising international 
organisations by means of the application of the parliamentary principle of democracy. As a first 
step, according to the norm dynamics of constructivism, I devised a hypothesis, “Convergence 
(Divergence) among norm entrepreneurs (potential epistemic communities) around the causal 
beliefs of the democratic deficit problem of international organisations will decrease (increase) 
the global democratic deficit and thus make the creation of an international parliamentary 
assembly more (less) likely”. 
 
Before testing this hypothesis, I distinguished three inter-related political concepts of democracy, 
from which I defined what constitutes a global democratic gap: that is, Power (Authority), 
Accountability and Legitimacy. Elections, democratic (citizen) representation and transparency 
gained through oversight by democratically elected officials are claimed within the general 
context of the existing literature to be the most pertinent to the foundational normative 
commitments of democracy, especially at the national level. In this regard, I chose the 
accountability and input legitimacy (as opposed to output legitimacy that concerns substantive 
outcomes rather than processes) as a criterion for assessing whether potential epistemic 
communities converge around causal beliefs about a democratic deficit in international 
organisations, having observed that they seem to have all agreed upon the concerns about the 
problem and the need for launching a UN Parliamentary Assembly. Upon closely examining 154 
quotes in total spoken by 111 professionals, experts, intellectuals, Speakers of Parliament, 
Members of Parliament and Presidents of regional and international organisations, 95% of them 
have the same cause and effect relationships, converging around the fact that the lack of 
accountability and input legitimacy has actually caused the problem.  
 
In addition, realism and neoliberal institutionalism can be used as a supplement to explain why a 
global parliament has not realized yet, albeit widespread agreement among almost all members 
of epistemic communities about norms. As for realism, power inequalities among Member States 
might be a hindrance to the spread of the norm in question, while neoliberal institutionalism 
suggests that competing norms within the organisation between a solidarist vision (placing more 
emphasis on individual human rights) versus a plauralist order (focusing on the protection of 
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democracy through the affirmation of sovereignty) also serve as a stumbling block. On a similar 
note, not only is the UN reform overwhelmingly possessed with an underrepsentation issue in the 
UNSC and an unfair exercise of power by a few industrialised states, namely P5 Members with 
veto power, but also the IPU, which is the sole organisation that represents the legislative branch 
of governments on a global scale, is driven by an ambitious plan to play a leading role in 
embodying the parliamentary vision for international cooperation, instead of assuming a 
secondary role supporting the UN or its parliamentary organ in the future, which may replace the 
IPU’s functions.  
 
If a longer-term process of building a global political community should finally come to an end, 
we can draw on the lesson of the European Parliament, recommending that a UN legislature 
could start with a consultative Parliamentary Assembly consisting of representatives chosen by 
the national parliaments and would be gradually expanded to become a directly-elected body. 
The first stage of this two-phased process will allow a UN Parliamentary Assembly to be created 
easily and inexpensively so that it can provide at least a valid democratic link between the UN 
and the global citizens through their representatives in the national parliaments for the time being. 
But these complex procedures are essentially beyond the scope of this paper and subject to 
further research.  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix: 
 
Composition of Members of Potential Epistemic Communities mentioned in the Pre-1950-2014 
Selected Quotes on Global Democracy and a World Parliament 
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List of Abbreviations  
 
UNPA: United Nations Parliamentary Assembly 
MPs: Members of Parliament 
WTO: World Trade Organization 
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WB: World  
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
P5: Five permanent members 
UNSC: UN Security Council 
G8: Group of 8 
R2P: Responsibility to Protect 
IPU: Inter-Parliamentary Union 
CEUNPA: Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly 
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